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QUESTION PRESENTED
Can the National Collegiate Athletic Association properly
ask students who voluntarily participate in its sporting events
to submit to drug tests to ensure that the athletic competitions
it sponsors are conducted in as safe, healthful, and fair
environment as possible?
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)

)
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal From the Judgment of the Superior Court
of the State of California, County of Santa Clara
The Honorable Conrad L. Rushing, Judge
Review of the Court of Appeal,
Sixth District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On January 6, 1987, plaintiff Simone Levant filed a
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") in Santa Clara
Superior Court.

(2 C.T. 1)

The action sought to enjoin the NCAA

from prohibiting Levant's participation in NCAA competitions
based upon her refusal to comply with its mandatory drug testing
program.

(2 C.T. 2, 16)

A preliminary injunction was granted on

March 13, 1987, prohibiting the NCAA from preventing Levant's
participa^on in intercollegiate diving competition and from
enforcing its drug testing program against her.

(2 C.T. 19-22)

The preliminary injunction was dissolved on May 11, 1987, by
stipulation of the parties when Levant graduated from Stanford
University and was no longer eligible for NCAA competition.
1

Hiii

V,

National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642,

1649 n.4 (1990).
The respondents, Jennifer Hill and J. Barry McKeever, were
added as plaintiffs by amended complaints filed in February and
July, 1987.

Id.

On July 20, 1987, Stanford University was

granted leave to intervene on behalf of respondents.

(2 C.T. 25)

The court issued a temporary restraining order on August 26,
1987, prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing the provisions of its
drug testing program against all Stanford teams and athletes.
C.T. 26-28)

(2

On December 18, 1987, the court issued a preliminary

injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing its drug testing
program against Stanford or its students except in the sports of
football and men's basketball.

(2 C.T. 78-82)

After a trial in

February and March, 1988, Judge Conrad L. Rushing, sitting
without a jury, permanently enjoined the NCAA from enforcing the
provisions of its drug testing program against Stanford and its
students, including those in football and men's basketball.
Hill. 223 Cal App- 3d at 1649 n.4.

The court found that the

program violated the California constitutional right of privacy
because the NCAA failed to show a ’compelling need for its drug
testing program.
District affirmed.

at 1651.

The Court of Appeal for the Sixth

Id. at 1647.

This Court granted petition for

review on December 20, 1990.
Statement of Facts
The petitioner, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, is an unincorporated association of more than 1,000
colleges, universities, and conferences of which Stanford
University is a member.

Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
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Ass*n. , 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 1648 (1990).

It is the primary

body governing intercollegiate sports in America.

Id.

By a vote of its membership at its 1986 annual convention,
the NCAA established a drug testing program for those
participating in NCAA championships and NCAA-certified postseason
football bowl games.

(1 C.T. 19)

or during the regular season.

Tests are not conducted before

(1 C.T. 31)

The program was approved after several years of study by the
NCAA that included a report issued by a special drug testing
committee setting forth a detailed proposal for a drug testing
program (2 C.T. 92-104) and a Michigan State University study
commissioned by the NCAA to investigate the extent of drug use by
college athletes.

(2 C.T. 105-26)

The NCAA decided to study this problem following a drug
scandal that rocked the 1983 Pan American Games.
11:16)

(1 R.T. 7:26-

After athletes from another country tested positive for

drugs, about fifteen United States athletes hurriedly left the
Games before their competitions were held.

(1 R.T. 8:13-20)

Some of them were enrolled at NCAA schools.

(1 R.T. 8:21-25)

The purpose of the program is to provide clean, equitable
competition (1 C.T. 19) and to protect the health and safety of
participating student-athletes.

(2 C.T. 129)

The list of

prohibited substances includes those generally purported to be
performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to the health
and safety of the student-athletes.

(2 C.T. 129)

The prohibited

substances are divided into six categories, including one for
street drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, another that includes
anabolic steroids, and one that covers sympathomimetic amines,

3

some of which are contained in over-the-counter cold and diet
medications.

(2

C.T. 132-33)

Although medical experts disagree

on the performance enhancing effect of many of these drugs,
testimony from witnesses on both sides confirms that there is a
perception among athletes that some of these drugs, such as
steroids, enhance athletic performance.

(Supp. R.T. 2)

The

testimony was also undisputed that the use of drugs such as
amphetamines, cocaine, and steroids can seriously harm the health
of student-athletes and can cause permanent physiological damage.
(Supp. R.T. 1)
The NCAA testing procedure is modeled after those used by
the United States and International Olympic committees.
12:6-9)

(1 R.T.

It includes elaborate protocols designed to protect the

confidentiality of test subjects and results.

(2 C.T. 133-37)

All students competing in NCAA-sponsored sports are required to
sign a consent form agreeing to participate in the drug testing
program or be ruled ineligible.

(2 C.T. 129)

The consent form

is contained in a booklet that includes detailed program
procedures, a list of the prohibited substances, and penalties
for failure to conform with program rules.

(2 C.T. 127-137)

Students are selected for testing based upon position of
finish in competition, playing time, random selection, or upon
suspicion.

(2 C.T. 134)

Students selected for testing are

required to complete a form indicating drug use, including overthe-counter drugs and prescription medication.

(2 C.T. 134)

If

the declaration is consistent with the results of a urine test, a
student who tests positive will not necessarily be ruled
ineligible.

(2 C.T. 134)

Exceptions also may be made for

4

students who have a documented medical need for certain
prohibited drugs.

(2 C.T. 130)

Students must report for testing

within an hour after completion of their competition.
134)

(2 C.T.

NCAA personnel monitor the process from the time an athlete

is informed he or she has been selected to produce a urine sample
to ensure the integrity of the process.

(2 C.T. 135)

Once a

student-athlete provides an adequate sample, he or she divides it
into two bottles marked *'A'* and "B,” the bottles are sealed and
an secret code number specific to that student-athlete is
attached.

(2 C.T. 135)

The student then signs a form attesting

that there were no irregularities in the procedure.

(2 C.T. 135)

The specimens are shipped to an NCAA-certified laboratory,
where they are tested by the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
method.

(2 C.T. 133)

control checks.
tested.

These labs are subject to periodic quality

(2 C.T. 134)

At the lab, the ”A'* sample is

If the *'A*' sample is positive for any prohibited

substance, the NCAA is notified and informed of any declaration
made by the student-athlete on his or her form.

(2 C.T. 136)

No

athlete can be suspended until his or her school is notified of
the result and the "B” sample is tested.

If the ”B” sample

confirms the results of the "A" sample test, the athlete is
subject to disciplinary action.

(2 C.T. 136)

First offense

includes ineligibility from postseason competition for ninety
days.

(2 C.T. 131)

If an athlete tests positive for a second

time after serving a ninety-day suspension, the penalty is T^ss
of post-season eligibility in all sports for the current and
following academic year.

(2 C.T. 131)

Of the 3,511 athletes tested in the initial year of testing
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during the 1986-87 season, thirty-four were declared ineligible,
mostly in the sport of football, including two at Stanford.
(Supp. R.T. 7)

In 1987-88, there were thirty-one positive tests,

twenty of them in football.

(Supp. R.T. 7)

The respondents, Jennifer Hill and J. Barry McKeever, were
athletes at Stanford University.

(Supp. R.T, 1)

Hill was on the

women's soccer team for four years and served as co-captain her
senior year.
program.

(Supp. R.T. 1)

(2 C.T. 45)

She was tested under the NCAA

McKeever was a linebacker on the football

team and attended Stanford on an athletic scholarship.
R.T. 1-2)

(Supp.

McKeever signed an NCAA drug testing consent form

before the 1986 season.

(2 R.T. 381:25-382:1)

He was given a

urine test by the NCAA at Stanford before the 1986 Gator Bowl.
(2 R.T. 382:17-21)
Hill and McKeever objected to the drug testing, in part,
because they found the prospect of urinating in the presence of
an NCAA monitor objectionable.

(Supp. R.T. 2)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellate court erred in requiring that the NCAA, a
private, voluntary organization, show a compelling need in order
that its drug testing program not violate the privacy provision
of the California Constitution.

The three-part test the court

imposed on the NCAA necessitated that it show:

(1) the purpose

of the drug testing program relates to its regulatory goals of
preserving the health of athletes and the integrity of its
athletic competition; (2) there is a compelling need for the drug
testing program; and (3) there are no less offensive, viable
alternatives to the drug testing program.
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This test, which is

known as the Baaley test, was created to curtail government
intrusion into privacy interests.

Baalev v. Washington Township

Hospital Pist. , 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505 (1966).

Nothing in Baaley or

its progeny state that this test of strict scrutiny was intended
to apply to private, voluntary organizations such as the NCAA.
Private, voluntary organizations are significantly different
from state actors.

Their actions do not require nor should they

be subjected to the strict scrutiny required of government or
those acting under the color of law.
Courts, including this one, have recognized that a
"compelling need” test need not be met in all circumstances in
which the privacy right is implicated.

When danger to health is

in issue, justification for the invasion of privacy is measured
by showing that a rational basis for the action exists.

Courts

have also determined whether privacy rights have been violated by
balancing the individual's right to privacy against the state
interest involved.
Because the NCAA drug testing program is based substantially
on health concerns, the rational basis standard would be a proper
test for this Court to apply.

Moreover, as the policy behind its

drug testing is reasonably related to achieving its health and
safety goals, the NCAA meets this standard.
Alternatively, the Court should adopt the balancing test
widely used by this and other courts in privacy cases.

Because

privacy expectations are diminished in the context of athletics,
the NCAA drug testing program constitutes a "minimal intrusion"
into the privacy rights of college athletes.

It is, therefore,

apparent that the NCAA has met the balancing test by showing that

7

^he in'teres^ of any individual stLuden^ in voluntarily
participating in intercollegiate competition does not outweigh
the NCAA's substantial interest in protecting the health and
safety of student-athletes and the integrity of competition
through its drug testing program.
Even if the stringent Baalev test applies, the appellate
court erred in its application because the NCAA met its burden of
proof at trial.

A correct reading of the data demonstrates there

is substantial drug use among college athletes.

Thus, as the

drug testing program is related to the NCAA's goals of ensuring
the health of athletes and integrity of competition, the first
prong of the Bagley test was met.

Furthermore, the NCAA program

is a - necessary and tempered response to the problems of drug
abuse in sports and society,

in showing this compelling need for

its drug testing program, the NCAA met the second prong of the
Bagiev test.

The final prong of the Bagiev test was met by the

NCAA when ample evidence was presented that there is no less
offensive, viable alternative to the drug testing program.

The

appellate court pointed to drug education as a less offensive
alternative.

But in doing so, it merely substituted its beliefs

for the judgment of a distinguished group of drug education and
drug testing experts assembled by the NCAA to implement its drug
testing program.

Drug testing is the most effective and accurate

method for the NCAA to achieve its regulatory goal.
~
I.

ARGUMENT

THE APPELLATE COURT APPLIED TOO STRICT A STANDARD IN
EVALUATING THE NCAA'S DRUG TESTING PROGRAM.
A.

Introduction

The court erred in holding the NCAA, a private voluntary
8

organization, to a standard created to restrict government
intrusion into the right of privacy.*

Nothing in the legislative

history or the judicial opinions of this or any other court
supports a conclusion that private, voluntary organizations must
be held to the same strict standard under Article I, Section 1 of
the California Constitution that is required of entities whose
actions rise to the level of state action.^
The appellate court determined that the NCAA had ”to show a
compelling interest” to justify its drug testing program.

Hill

v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642,
1656 (1990).

It outlined a three-part test the NCAA was required

to satisfy to meet its burden of demonstrating a compelling need.
The test required the NCAA show "that: (1) the testing program
relates to the purposes of the NCAA regulations which confer the
benefit (participation in intercollegiate competition); (2) the
utility of imposing the program manifestly outweighs any
resulting impairment of the constitutional right; and (3) there
are no less offensive alternatives.”
omitted).

Id. at 1656-57 (citations

The appellate court concluded the NCAA failed to meet

* Because of the important precedential constitutional issues
in this case, the standard of review is de novo. "'When, as here,
the application of law to fact requires us to make value judgments
about the law and its policy underpinnings, and when, as here, the
application of law to fact is of clear precedential importance, the
policy reasons for de novo review are satisfied and we should not
hesitate
to
review
the
[trial]
judge's
determination
independently,'"
People v. Louis. 42 Cal. 3d 969, 988 (1986)
(quoting tr.S. v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 190+)).
^ Article I, section 1 provides:
"All people are by nature
free and independent and have certain inalienable rights.
Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy." Cal. Const, art. 1, S If amended
1974.
9

all three elements of the test and ruled the drug testing program
violates the right to privacy.

Id, at 1675.

The three-part test used by the appellate court was adopted
from one created by this Court 25 years ago for use in
significantly different circumstances.

In Baalev v. Washington

Town_shiP Hospital District. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 510-11 (1966)
(citations omitted), this Court ruled unconstitutional restraints
placed on the political activity of a governmental agency
employee.

In doing so, the Court created a three-part test that

must be met before a "government may, when circumstances
inexorably- so require, impose conditions upon the enjoyment of
publicly conferred benefits despite a resulting qualification of
constitutional rights.”

Id. at 505 (emphasis added).

This test, which has since been referred to by the Court as
the Baaley test, was developed independently of and prior to the
inclusion of the privacy amendment into the California
Constitution in 1972.

Nothing about its creation or initial

application indicates it was intended to or should be used in
cases that concern possible restrictions on privacy imposed by
private, voluntary organizations such as the NCAA.
Decisions by this Court since the creation of the Baalev
test have emphasized its applicability to actions of state and
local government.

This was particularly true in the Court's

clear reformulation and endorsement of the test in Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Mvers. 29 Cal. 3d 252 (1981),"5'
case relied upon by the appellate court in imposing the Baalev
test on the NCAA.

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1657.

In Myers, the

Court spoke of "the government's burden of demonstrating the

10

propriety of the condition or limitation under the Bagley test”
in striking down as unconstitutional legislative restrictions
placed on state funding for abortions.
(first emphasis added).

Myers. 29 Cal. 3d at 268

See also Long Beach Citv Employees

City of Long Beach. 41 Cal, 3d 937, 952-53 (1986)

AsB»n. V,

(city-required involuntary polygraph tests intrude upon public
employee's privacy); Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199,
213 (1985)

(permitting preliminary injunction preventing

implementation of county welfare plan preventing single and
employable residents from receiving cash grants) .
This Court has never applied the Bagiev test to a private,
voluntary organization such as the NCAA,

Bagiev and the cases

that endorse its three-part test do not define any limits on the
actions of private, voluntary entities, rather "[t]he premise of
such cases is that the power of government, federal or state, to
withhold certain benefits from its citizens does not encompass
the power to bestow such benefits based on an arbitrary
deprivation of constitutional rights."

Wilkinson v. Times Mirror

Corp,, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1050 (1989)

(emphasis added)

(holding that preemployment drug testing by a private employer
does not violate the privacy provision).

Courts have

historically invoked the Bagiev test to check government abuse,
not limit private action.
Just as the Bagiev test was unsuitable in this case, so was
requiring the NCAA show a "compelling need" for the drug testing
program.

That requirement, like the Bagiev test, has its roots

in limiting government intrusions into constitutionally protected
areas of privacy.

The one federal and one state case cited by

11

the appellate court in imposing this standard on the NCAA concern
infringements on privacy by government.
at 1656,
(1965)

Hill. 223 Cal, App. 3d

The cases, Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S, 479, 497

(striking down Connecticut law regulating birth control

information provided by a private health clinic), and City of
Carmel-bv-the-Sea v. Young. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268 (1970)

(holding

unconstitutional state financial disclosure law for public
officials), are silent as to the standard that should be imposed
on a private, voluntary organization such as the NCAA.
Nothing in Baaley^ Young or their progeny state the
requirement of strict scrutiny was intended to apply to the
situation before the Court.

Private, voluntary organizations are

significantly different from state actors and therefore their
actions do not require nor should they be subjected to the strict
scrutiny required of government or those acting under the color
of law.
B.

In rotelv applying the Baalev test the appellate court
ignored the important difference between the strict
rules necessary to govern state action and the more
limited role the state olavs in controlling the
membership of a private, voluntary organization.

Recent federal court decisions are in accord that the NCAA
is a private entity whose conduct does not rise to the level of
state action.

See, e.g,, 0*Halloran v. University of Washington,

679 F, Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash, 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), and cases cited therein.

Indeed,

even the United States Supreme Court has held that NCAA
regulatory functions do not constitute state action, even when a
member state university enforces the NCAA regulation.

National

Collegiate Athletic Ass*n. v, Tarkanian. 488 U.S. 179, 196
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(1988) .
No one is compelled to join the NCAA; its actions do not
carry the force of law.

The NCAA has ”no government powers to

facilitate its investigation."

Id. at 197.

It has "no power to

subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert
sovereign authority over any individual."

Id.

Those who join

the NCAA voluntarily agree to abide by its regulations.
Universities are free to leave the NCAA and conduct their
athletic programs without its sanction and rewards.

Athletes are

free to participate in NCAA-sponsored programs or choose another
outlet for their athletic endeavors.
The fact that the alternatives to NCAA competition might be
less-financially rewarding to the school does not mean there are
no other options.

"The university's desire to remain a

powerhouse among the Nation's college basketball teams is
understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously would
thwart that goal.

But that UNLV's options were unpalatable does

not mean that they were nonexistent."

Id. at 198-99 n,19,

(rejecting an argument that the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
("UNLV") had no alternative but to join the NCAA and comply with
its rules).
Neither was Stanford required to join the NCAA, but once it
did, nothing required the respondents to pursue their personal
interest in athletics through Stanford teams enrolled in NCAAsponsored "Competition.

Both individuals were free to pursue

their respective interests by other means.

But once they

voluntarily chose to compete in NCAA events, they were obliged to
follow NCAA regulations.

Such an arrangement does not and should
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not call for the same degree of strict scrutiny necessary to
guard against involuntary government intrusions into the privacy
area.

The Baalev test therefore was inappropriate.
C.

Judicial interpretations of the privacy amendment
provide no support for measuring the actions of a
private, voluntary organization such as the NCAA by the
same standard that governs state action.

The California privacy provision is not all inclusive.

The

Court declared this in its first decision interpreting the
privacy amendment when it stated the ''amendment does not purport
to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy."^

White v.

Davis. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 (1975).
The Court reached this conclusion by examining the
"'legislative history*" of the amendment as contained in the
"election brochure 'argument'" in favor of its passage.

It

identified four "principle 'mischiefs'" to which the amendment
was directed.

Id.

These '"mischiefs'" were "(1)

'government

snooping' and the secret gathering of personal information; (2)
the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal
information by government and business interests; (3) the
improper use of information properly obtained for a specific
purpose .

.

.

(4) the lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy

of existing records."

Id.

(emphasis added).

No reference was made to what, if any, applicability the
amendment has to private, voluntary organizations such as the
NCAA.

In^he absence of any legislative history to the cont^ry,

^ The Court in White went on to say "such intervention must be
justified by a compelling interest" in finding that police covert
surveillance on a state university campus constituted a prima facie
violation of the privacy provision. White. 13 Cal. 3d at 775-76.
But unlike the present case, White concerned state action.
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the appellate court had no reason to conclude the privacy
provision was intended to cover the NCAA's drug testing program.
Such a narrow reading of the intent of the privacy provision is
not without precedent.

In People v. Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d 697,

709 (1979), the Court relied on these grounds in ruling the
"right of privacy does not encompass a right of access to drugs
of unproven efficacy" such as laetrile.

"In the absence of any

evidence that the voters in amending the California Constitution
to create a right of privacy intended to protect conduct of the
sort engaged in by defendants, we have no hesitation in holding"
this action does not "offend that constitutional provision."

I(Ll

at 709-10.
Moreover, this Court has never held that the state
constitutional guarantee of privacy applies to private interests,
let alone the more limited interests of a private, voluntary
organization.

As recently as two and one-half years ago, the

Court reserved judgment on whether the privacy provision applies
at all in cases of a private entity.
48 Cal. 3d 370, 389 n.l4 (1989).

Schmidt v. Superior Court*

In Schmidt, the Court, in

upholding a minimum age requirement on mobilehome park residents,
declined to say "under what circumstances, if any, purely private
action by a property owner or landlord would constitute a
violation of the state constitutional privacy provision."
(emphasis added) .

Id.

The Court has thus implicitly recognized that

distinctly different considerations apply in determining whether
the acts of private entities impact on the right to privacy.
Lower courts have acknowledged this difference.

"At least

some types of nongovernmental conduct can interfere with the
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right granted by the constitutional provision.”
217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1094 (1990)

Semore v. Pool.

(emphasis added).

Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1040.

See also

This limiting language is

implicit recognition that restrictions on nongovernment action
under the privacy clause are not as severe as restrictions on
state action.

It follows that private entities should not be

held to the standard of "compelling need.”
Even the appellate court recognized that courts have not
always required a showing of "compelling need” in cases impacting
on the right to privacy.

Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656 n.7.

It

nevertheless chose to ignore this body of law and impose the
"compelling need” standard set forth in Baalev.

The court

justified its action on the ground that the "California courts
deciding claims under article 1, section 1, require the state to
show a compelling interest before it can invade a fundamental
privacy right."

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656 (emphasis added).

This unqualified statement ignores the extensive body of law
developed by this Court and the lower courts, holding that a
"compelling need" test need not be met in all circumstances in
which the privacy right is implicated.
D.

When danger to health is in issue, courts have applied
a rational basis test.

Indeed, in cases involving medical care, the Court has said
that "when danger to health exists . . . state regulation shall
be tested^nder the rational basis standard.”

Privitera. 23—Cal.

3d at 703 (citing Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).

Under

this approach, justification for the invasion of privacy will be
measured by a showing that a rational basis for the action
exists.

The action must bear "a reasonable relationship to the
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achievement of" the goal of protecting the "health and safety" of
those concerned.

Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d at 708-09.

This requires

a considerably lesser showing than that needed to meet the
compelling need test.
This lower showing for health care matters was reaffirmed by
the Court in Conservatorship of Valerie N.. 40 Cal. 3d 143
(1985).

In upholding a lower court decision that prevented

sterilization of a conservatee, the Court cited Privitera while
noting that "[n]o suggestion is made here that the restriction is
justified because the medical procedure poses a significant
danger to the health of the patient.

We need not consider,

therefore, whether a lesser interest would meet the
constitutional imperative."
The implication is clear:

Valerie N.. 40 Cal. 3d at 164 n.26.
Not all circumstances require a

showing of compelling need.

Some invasions of privacy interests

are justified by satisfying a lesser standard.
E.

In other contexts, courts have applied a balancing
approach in privacy cases without anv mention of a
compelling need component.

In addition to applying a rational basis test, courts have
used a balancing test in several privacy amendment cases.

This

Court adopted this balancing approach in Valley Bank v. Superior
Court. 15 Cal. 3d 652 (1975).

There the Court balanced a

person’s right to privacy against the state interest involved.
In declining to order the bank to release certain confidential
information in the context of a civil suit, the Court ruled it
must "indulge in a careful balancing of the right of the civil
litigants to discover relevant facts, on the one hand, with the
right of bank customers to maintain reasonable privacy regarding
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their financial affairs, on the other.”

Id. at 657.

The Court followed this balancing approach in Dovle v. State
Bar, 32 Cal, 3d 12 (1982),

In Dovle. the Court ruled the State

Bar of California did not violate the right to privacy in
requiring an attorney to turn over records in connection with a
disciplinary proceeding.

The "privacy interest is not absolute

but must be balanced against the need for disclosure."
(emphasis added).

Id. at 20

Once again the Court recognized limits to the

privacy right and that the right must be weighed against other
legitimate concerns.
Other courts have followed this Court's lead and applied a
balancing test in a variety of factual settings in which the
California constitutional right to privacy has been implicated.
These include deciding whether to compel discovery of
confidential medical records, Heda v. Superior Court. 225 Cal.
App. 3d 525, 528 (1990)

("Defendant's privacy interests must be

weighed against plaintiff's interest in obtaining trial
preference."); attempts to interfere with the right to an
abortion, Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Butte Glenn
Medical Society. 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 1983)

("the

court must balance the severity of the harm caused"), and most
importantly in two recent decisions concerning drug testing of
employees and job applicants.^

Semore, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087;

* Lower courts are not in agreement on which standard is
appropriate in the private employment setting.
See Soroka v.
Davton Hudson Coro.. 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13204, 13207 (Oct. 25,
1991) (compelling need required by employer for psychological
testing of job applicants); Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Co, 218 Cal, App. 3d 1, 20 (1990) (rejects balancing approach in
favor of compelling interest test in case involving drug testing of
employees).
But these courts did not reach the present issue of
which standard applies to private, voluntary organizations.
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Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App, 3d 1034.
In semore. the court applied a "balancing test” in
considering whether the discharge of an employee for refusing to
consent to a random pupillary reaction eye test violated his
right to privacy.

Semore, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1097.

"The

resolution of the dispute depends upon balancing an employee's
expectations of privacy against the employer's needs to regulate
the conduct of its employees at work.”

Id.

The court did not

rule on the constitutionality of the test, holding only that the
trial court erred in deciding the issue on a demurrer.

Id. at

1100.

Semore followed the balancing approach in workplace drug
testing issues enumerated three months earlier in Wilkinson,

The

court in Wilkinson held constitutional a preemployment drug
testing program against a challenge under the privacy amendment.
**A court must engage in a balancing of interests rather than a
deduction from principle to determine [privacy right]
boundaries."

Wilkinson. 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1046.

The court

said that "as long as that right is not substantially burdened or
affected, justification by a compelling interest is not required.
Instead, the operative question is whether the challenged conduct
is reasonable."

Id. at 1047.

Therefore, nothing dictates that a court apply a "compelling
need" test in all privacy cases.

Courts have adopted different

standards^depending on the parties involved and interests bHxng
protected.

Because the NCAA is a private, voluntary organization

whose regulatory functions do not rise to the level of state
action, the test of strict scrutiny imposed by the lower courts
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was inappropriate.
II.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT STANDARD SHOULD APPLY TO THE
NCAA*S DRUG TESTING PROGRAM TURNS ON THE INTEREST TO BE
PROTECTED.
A.

Because this issue concerns public health, the proper
test for this Court to apply is the rational basis test
enumerated in Privitera.

As one of the NCAA*s primary functions is to protect the
health of athletes, its drug testing program should be judged
under the rational basis standard enumerated in Privitera.
In Privitera. the defendants were found guilty of conspiring
to prescribe and sell the drug laetrile under a statute that
prohibits distribution of all unapproved drugs for the
alleviation or cure of cancer.

Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d at 701.

The statute is based on a concern that the use of such unproven
drugs can lead to improper medical care and further health risk.
Id. at 705-06.

"If the state has the power to ban a drug with a

recognized medical use because of its potential for abuse, then
— given a rational basis for doing so — the state clearly has
the power to ban a drug not recognized as effective for its
intended use.

Id, at 705.

The issue and concern in this case is

similar.
The NCAA drug-testing program also is based on substantial
health concerns.

(2 C.T. 129)

The NCAA is concerned about

improper drug use and the damaging effect it has on the health of
athletes.

Some of these drugs, such as cocaine and marijuana,

not only are unapproved; they are illegal.

Others, such as

steroids, pose a serious health risk if used for other than their
intended purpose or in dosages exceeding those recommended.
Steroids have been linked to liver failure, tumors and a host of
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o^her serious health problems.

(2 R.T. 268:8-272:20)

The debate over the usefulness of steroids in athletic
competition is comparable to the debate over the efficacy of
laetrile and its benefits to cancer patients.

If the state of

California is allowed to justify the protections designed to
ensure the health of its residents under a rational basis test,
it logically follows that an organization such as the NCAA, whose
purpose includes fostering healthy, clean athletic competition
between college athletes, should be judged by the same standard.
Under the test established in Privitera, the inquiry is
limited to deciding whether the challenged policy bears "a
reasonable relationship to the achievement of the legitimate"
health and safety goal.

Privitera. 23 Cal. 3d at 702-

NCAA*s drug testing meets this standard.

The threat of drug

testing can be a legitimate deterrent to drug use.
679 F. Supp. at 1004.

The

0*Halloran.

Additionally, the detection of drug use

through testing can lead to needed diagnostic and therapeutic
help for the athlete.
B-

Alternatively, the Court should adopt the balancing
test widely used by this and other courts in privacy
cases.

If the Court is unwilling to adopt a rational basis standard
for the NCAA's drug testing program, then it should apply a
balancing test.

In fact, this Court used a balancing test in

another privacy case that concerned internal disciplinary action.
In Doyle, ^he Court found the interest of the State Bar of —
California in conducting a disciplinary proceeding outweighed an
attorney's interest in the privacy of his records.
Cal. 3d at 20-21.

Dovle. 32

A related issue confronts the Court in this
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case.

Instead of a question of disciplining an attorney, the

issue is whether the interest of the NCAA in preserving the
health of athletes and the integrity of its athletic competition
through the disciplinary means of a drug testing program
outweighs the objections on privacy grounds of any individual
athlete.
Some lower courts have utilized a "reasonableness” or
"balancing” test in cases concerning drug testing.

See

Wilkinson. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034; Semore. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087.
wi ikinson and Semore differ from this case in that they concerned
the rights of employees or job applicants.

The right to a job is

a more fundamental right than that of participating in voluntary
athletic competition, yet a "reasonableness” or "balancing"
approach was all the courts required to protect that right under
the privacy provision.

It naturally follows then that if such an

approach was all that was necessary to protect employment rights,
it should more than suffice in this case.
The United States Supreme Court also has adopted a balancing
test for use in drug testing cases in an employment setting.

See

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives* Ass'n.. 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(upheld drug testing of railroad employees) ; National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab. 489 U.S. 656 (1989)

(upheld

suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs Service employees).
Using this balancing test, a court weighs the public interest in
the testing program "against the privacy concerns implicatecT^y
the tests."

Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 679.

The test has its roots

in the Fourth Amendment balancing approach utilized in issues
involving searches and seizures.
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Skinner. 489 U.S. at 619.

Because this Court has applied a balancing test in cases
involving the right to privacy and because the United States
Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test for use in drug test
cases, a balancing approach is a proper test to apply to the
NCAA's drug testing program.
One federal court already has ruled that the NCAA program
satisfies a balancing test.

OJHalloran. 679 F. Supp. at 1000.

The court concluded "the larger interests of the health of the
student-athlete as well as the public's and the competing
athletes* perception of the fairness of intercollegiate athletics
greatly outweighs the relatively small compromise of an
individual's privacy interest, which is diminished in the context
of collegiate athletics."

Id. at 1007.

Similar diminished expectations of privacy were a critical
factor in tipping the balancing test in Skinner in favor of
upholding the drug testing program.

The Court found the tests

posed "only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of
privacy."

Skinner. 489 U.S. at 628.

143 Cal. App. 3d 337, 343-44 (1983)

See also Miller v. Murohv,

("Some constitutional

restrictions, even though identified with the right to privacy,
are deserving of less than strict scrutiny because of their
minimal intrusion into a person's privacy.")

(emphasis added)

(upholding local ordinances requiring pawnbrokers to obtain
customers' fingerprints).
T.

Because
context
program
privacy

privacy expectations are diminished irTthe
of athletics, the NCAA drug testing
constitutes a "minimal intrusion" into the
rights of college athletes.

The conditions under which college athletes compete and
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train substantially diminish their expectations of privacy in
connection with athletic competition.

Athletes routinely submit

to physical examinations and thus "reasonably should expect
effective inquiry into their fitness and probity."
U.S. at 672.

Von Raab. 489

They frequently undress around teammates in an open

locker room setting.

They urinate in shared lavatory facilities.

(2 R.T. 402:26-403:26).

Under these conditions random drug

testing is a reasonable intrusion into their privacy.

See

n*Halloran. 679 F. Supp. at 1005; Schaill bv Kross v. Tippecanoe
rnuntv School Corp. . 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)
(upholding drug testing program for high school athletes against
constitutional privacy attack).
The history of drug testing in sports further diminishes the
privacy expectation of college athletes.
mandatory in Olympic sports.

Drug testing is

The NCAA program is modeled after

those conducted by United States and International Olympic
committees.

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1648.

In light of the

experience and practice of these athletic organizations, the
respondents should not have expected to be exempt from compliance
when the NCAA instituted a similar program.
2.

The interest of the NCAA in providing clean,
equitable competition and protecting the health
and safety of student-athletes outweighs the
privacy interests of individual participants.

The NCAA has a legitimate concern about drug use in sports.
The respondents contend that the NCAA has overstated this
problem, but the United States Supreme Court has declared "there
can be no doubt that drug abuse is one of the most serious
problems confronting our society today."

24

Von Raab. 489 U.S. at

674.

The Court also observed "[t]here is little reason to

believe that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive
social problem."

Id.

The same is true of collegiate sports.

The first school year of NCAA drug testing resulted in
thirty-four athletes ruled ineligible, the second year twentyone.

Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1660-61.

But these results are

not conclusive as to the amount of drug use by college athletes.
A survey conducted for the NCAA in 1984 showed widespread use of
several drugs on the NCAA banned list.

(2 C.T. 105-126)

According to the survey, 36% of college athletes had used
marijuana or hashish within one year of the survey date, 31% had
used anti-inflamatories, 28% major pain medication, 17% cocaine,
8% amphetamines, 4% psychedelics, and 2% barbiturates or
tranquilizers.

(2 C.T. 125)

The respondents would have the Court believe that the lack
of more positive tests is proof drug use among college athletes
is minimal.

But a better conclusion is that the lack of more

positives is proof of the program's success.

The court in

Q'Halloran recognized this likely result by observing the testing
will "have a deterrent effect, and that over time less evidence
[of drug use] will be found,"

O'Halloran. 679 F. Supp. at 1004.

Nor should the relatively low number of positive drug tests
render a drug testing program unnecessary.

"Such evidence of the

program's success should not be used to demonstrate lack of need
for the program or that the program has no reasonable basisT”"
Id.

"The mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees

tested are entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the
program's validity."

Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 674.
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"When the

Government's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct,
a low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity
of the scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically
viewed as a hallmark of success."

Id. at 675-76 n.3.

The NCAA also has a significant interest in sponsoring
competitions that are untainted by drug use.

Drug-free

competitors ensure that NCAA events are fair, honest and clean.
The integrity of the NCAA and value of its sponsored events would
be seriously impaired by any taint from drugs.

More importantly,

the NCAA must ensure that only healthy athletes are placed into
competition.

An organization sponsoring athletic events would

not be fulfilling its responsibilities if it allowed unhealthy
athletes to compete.
Having established the NCAA has a need for its drug testing
program, the Court must next consider whether the procedures used
by the NCAA adequately protect privacy rights.

The lower courts

concluded that the NCAA program interfered with an athlete's
"right to keep medical confidentiality" and might keep athletes
from "taking a needed medication for fear that it will result in
a positive drug test."

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1666, 1668.

Such fears are groundless because the NCAA will not punish those
who declare before testing that they have a documented medical
need for some of the drugs that are included on the banned list.
(2 C.T. 130)
Drug testing is part of a medical program designed by the
NCAA to ensure the health of its competing athletes.
129)

(2 C.T.

Some intrusion into privacy is a necessary component of

almost all forms of medical care.
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The United States Supreme

Court acknowledged this in upholding a New York law requiring
disclosure to the state of patient use of some prescription
drugs.

Recognizing there are a "host" of "unpleasant invasions

of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care,"
the Court said "[n]evertheless, disclosures of private medical
information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance
companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential
part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient."

Whalen v.

Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
In this regard, the NCAA has taken precautions to ensure
that whatever disclosures of medical history required of the
athlete be treated with confidentiality.

Only if an athlete *s

"A" sample of urine tests positive for a prohibited substance
will laboratory personnel inform the NCAA of any information on
an athlete's declaration form that might indicate that a medical
condition or declared drug might account for the positive result
(2 C.T. 136)

Otherwise the samples are identified only by a

secret code.

(2 C.T. 135)

No athlete or school names are

supposed to be attached to the urine samples.
Program provisions that appear most intrusive into privacy
rights are actually the procedures most crucial in guaranteeing
athletes receive accurate test results.

Monitoring of the

athlete while producing a sample is critical to this end.

This

procedure diminishes the possibility of an incorrect result by
assuring that the sample tested belongs to the athlete.
"[Vjisual .

. . monitoring of the act of urination" might be

required as part of a drug testing program and because of "the
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desirability of such a procedure to ensure the integrity of the
sample."

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617, 626,

Still, the NCAA has

tried to honor individual privacy concerns by conducting the
monitoring as discretely as possible.

In the case of the

respondent, Barry McKeever, the monitor stood behind him and did
not directly observe him produce a sample.

(2 R.T. 389:24-391:2)

The need for the drug testing program and the safeguards
taken by the NCAA to ensure its integrity must be balanced
against the diminished privacy expectations of the student
athletes and the nature of the interest being protected.
The chance to play college football, soccer or any other
sport is not a fundamental right.

"It is certainly relevant to

the ultimate question of constitutionality . . . that the
activity to which random testing is attached is participating in
an extracurricular activity.

Random testing is not ... a

condition of a weightier benefit such as employment or school
attendance."

Schaill bv Kross. 864 F.2d at 1313.

The NCAA has met the balancing test by showing that the
interest of any individual student in voluntarily participating
in intercollegiate competition does not outweigh the NCAA's
substantial interest in protecting the health and safety of
student-athletes and the integrity of competition through its
drug testing program.
III. EVEN IF THE STRINGENT BAGLEY TEST APPLIES, THE APPELLATE
COURT-ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION BECAUSE THE NCAA MET ITS_
BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL.
Contrary to the conclusion of the lower courts, the NCAA
drug testing program is constitutional because it meets the
requirements of the Baalev test.
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Under this test, the NCAA was required to show that: "(1)
the testing program relates to the purposes of the NCAA
regulation which confer the benefit (participation in
intercollegiate competition); (2) the utility of imposing the
program manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of the
constitutional right; and (3) there are no less offensive
alternatives."

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1656-57 (citations

omitted).
A.

The NCAA met the first prong of the Baalev test bv
proving that the purpose of its drug testing program is
related to its regulatory goals of preserving the
health of athletes and the integrity of its athletic
competition.

The NCAA is a private, voluntary organization that sponsors
intercollegiate athletic competition.

In order to ensure the

fairness of such competition the NCAA instituted its drug testing
program "[s]© that no one participant might have an artificially
induced advantage, so that no one participant might be pressured
to use chemical substances in order to remain competitive and to
safeguard the health and safety of participants."

(2 C.T. 129)

These goals all relate to the NCAA*s stated purpose.
The appellate court ruled that the program conducted by the
NCAA did not meet these goals because the program itself was
flawed.

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1657-65, 1675.

A sampling of

the court's findings shows that its conclusions are not supported
by the evidence.
The court found, for example, that because the NCAA uses
three different laboratories, results between the three could
vary.

Id. at 1664.

But in doing so, the lower court ignored

evidence that, all labs must be approved by the NCAA and are
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subject to "periodic quality check[s]” to ensure compliance with
NCAA standards.

(2 C.T. 134)

The court also incorrectly concluded that "[a]11 evidence
taken together demonstrated that there was no drug involvement in
any sport except football, and that the problem related only to
steroid use and involved a small minority of football players."
Hill> 223 Cal- App. 3d at 1662.

This conclusion is in direct

conflict with undisputed testimony.

Of the fifty-five players

declared ineligible in the first two years of the drug testing
program, all but three were football players and thirty-two of
those were declared ineligible for steroid use.

Id. at 1660-61.

But that does not mean there was no involvement in any other
sport or that no drugs other than steroids were involved.

In

fact, fourteen players were ineligible because of positive
results for street drugs such as cocaine and marijuana.

Id. at

1661.
The court also failed to note that the primary reason the
drug problem appears limited to football is because the vast
majority of athletes subjected to drug testing were football
players.

In 1987-88, for example, 1,425 of the 1,589 (89,7%)

athletes tested were football players.

Id.

With such an

emphasis on testing participants in one sport played entirely by
men, the court should not have found so significant the finding
that no female athletes tested positive.

Id. at 1660.

The court took this lack of positives to conclude that drug
use is not a problem in college sports.

In so doing it

completely ignored the better explanation that the testing had
the desired deterrent effect.

See O'Halloran. 679 F, Supp. at
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1004 .
Such incorrect interpretations of the drug testing data and
procedures led the lower courts to erroneously conclude the NCAA
drug testing program does not relate to its regulatory goals.

A

correct reading of the data demonstrates there is drug use among
college athletes and that the NCAA's testing procedures are
valid.

On the basis of this evidence the conclusion is

inescapable that as the drug testing program is related to the
NCAA's goals of ensuring the health of athletes and integrity of
competition, the first prong of the Baalev test was met.
B.

Bv showing there is a compelling need for the drug
testing program, the NCAA satisfied the second prong of
the Bagiev test.

The NCAA has a compelling interest in protecting the health
and safety of its athletes and ensuring fair athletic
competition.

The appellate court either ignored or casually

dismissed the NCAA's arguments in this area when it erroneously
concluded that it failed to meet the second prong of the Bagiev
test.
Uncontroverted evidence was presented that all drugs on the
NCAA banned list are harmful if misused.
at 1668.

Hill, 223 Cal. App- 3d

The lower courts trivialized this finding by noting

"[a]spirin and even water can be dangerous if misused.”

Id.

But

the NCAA is not concerned about the use of aspirin and water.
Its list of banned drugs includes such illegal street drugs as
cocaine, marijuana and heroin, in addition to other substances
"purported to be performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful
to the health and safety of the student-athlete."

(2 C.T. 129)

Testimony from the respondent's own expert witness. Dr. David T.
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Lowenthal, identified drugs on the banned list as having the
potential to cause testicular atrophy, liver damage, tumors,
adverse reactions on the cardiovascular system such as
arrhythmias, hair growth, acne, and host of other side effects,
many which were identified as irreversible.
287:26)

(2 R.T. 267:25-

While it is true that some of the banned compounds can

be found in common over-the-counter remedies, this should not be
cause to invalidate the program.

The NCAA is not trying to halt

the therapeutic use of such substances.

Athletes whose declared

use of these substances is consistent with their test result are
not subject to disciplinary action.

(1 R.T. 38:1-39:7)

Under

this procedure, the appellate court's concern that ''[b]anning so
many useful medications may actually be harmful to the health and
safety of the athletes who are likely to be afraid of taking a
needed medication for fear that it will result in a positive drug
test" is groundless.

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1668.

The NCAA

is not out to punish therapeutic use of such medications; its
purpose is to stop the abuse of these substances.
The NCAA presented evidence that many of the banned
substances can affect athletic competition.

Some of these drugs

can enhance athletic competition, while others were shown to
hinder performance.

Either way the ability to conduct fair

competition is affected.

The lower court was preoccupied with a

concern for deciding which drugs might be performance enhancing
and which itright not while ignoring the conclusion that any —
improper drug use can have an adverse affect on the integrity of
athletic competition and the health of athletes.
The appellate court also questioned the failure of the
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program to test for alcohol use or ban smoking,
This criticism is irrelevant.

at

1668

-69.

5ee Loworn v. city nf

Chattanooga. 846 F.2d 1539, 1544 (6th Cir. 1988)

(argument that

urinalysis unconstitutional because alcohol abuse problems not
addressed "cloudCs] the complainant's true criticisms of drug
testing," since "problems of underinclusiveness are rarely
problems of constitutional magnitude unless they signify
impermissible discriminatory motives").
The NCAA program is a necessary and tempered response to the
problems of drug abuse in sports and society.

Through this

program the NCAA attempts to ensure fair competition and the
health and safety of the its athletes.

The importance of these

goals outweigh the minimal intrusion of privacy required for
their attainment.

This is particularly true with athletes, whose

expectation of privacy is diminished by the communal nature of
the locker room and the need for regular physical examinations.
In showing that there is a compelling need for its drug testing
program, the NCAA met the second prong of the Baalev test.
C.

The final prong _of . the Bagiev test was met by the NCAA
at trial when ample evidence was presented that there
is no viable alternative to the drug testing program.

Drug testing is the best method for the NCAA to achieve its
regulatory goal.

The appellate court points to drug education as

a more economical and effective means of combating the drug abuse
problem.

Hill. 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1673.

presented Tn this regard.

But no evidence was

It merely is the supposition of tHe

respondent converted into findings of fact.

The court has

substituted its beliefs for the judgment of a distinguished group
of drug education and drug testing experts assembled by the NCAA

33

to Implement its drug testing program.

(2 C.T. 92)

Much study went into the creation of this program.

The

result reflects the collective judgment of the NCAA staff, its
member schools, and worldwide recognized experts in the field of
drugs in sports.

(2 C.T. 92-104)

Those experts, such as Dr. Dan Hanley, a member of the NCAA
drug testing committee who has a thirty-one-year involvement in
international sports, are convinced that testing programs such as
those conducted by the NCAA are the best way to combat drug
abuse:
I have watched them use regulations, inspection of luggage,
inspection of quarters, education, brochures, posters,
speeches.
It*s my firm belief that if you're going to
control drugs in sport, you've got to do testing and you've
got to do good testing under a strict protocol where the
athlete is protected.
(1 R.T, 47:23-48:4)

To conduct a program without the procedural

safeguards recommended by the experts, such as monitoring of the
sample production, would subject the athletes to an increased
risk of error and unwarranted suspicion.

Moreover, the

opportunity for athletes to cheat would decrease the NCAA's
ability to assist students suffering from drug abuse and diminish
the program's deterrent effect.

(Supp. R.T. 1)

In showing that there are no viable alternatives to drug
testing in meeting its regulatory goals, the NCAA satisfied the
final prong of the Baalev test.
^

CONCLUSION

At a time when an authority as mighty as the United States
Supreme Court calls drug abuse "one of the most serious problems
confronting our society today,"

Von Raab. 489 U.S. at 674, the

drug testing program of the NCAA is the most modern means
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available to deter the use of drugs in sports.

The program poses

a minimal intrusion into the privacy rights of the athletes while
meeting the mission of the NCAA to protect the health and safety
of its student athletes while ensuring the integrity of
intercollegiate competition.
The petitioner prays that the Court vacate the permanent
injunction prohibiting it from conducting its drug testing
program at Stanford University.
Dated:

November 5, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,

Julie Reagin

Curt Holbreich
Counsel for Petitioner
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